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Abstract
We consider a cooperative game with a bipartition that indicates which players are participating. This paper
provides an analytical solution for the Shapley value when the worth of a coalition only depends on the number
of participating coalition players. The computational complexity grows linearly in the number of players, which
contrasts with the usual exponential increase. Our result remains true when we introduce (i) randomization of the
bipartition, and (ii) randomly draw a characteristic function.
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1 Introduction
A cooperative game (N,v) consists of a player set N and a characteristic function v ∈FN , whereFN denotes the
class of functions v : 2N → R that satisfy v( /0) = 0. The worth v(N) of the game is the worth generated by the
coalition of all n players in N. The Shapley value φ :FN → Rn (Shapley [1953]) is an allocation of this worth.
For any player i ∈ N:
φi(v) = ∑
{S:i/∈S}
|S|!(n−|S|−1)!
n!
[v(S∪ i)− v(S)] (1)
where |S| is the number of players in S. It follows from (1) that the Shapley value is a linear function:
φ(v) = αφ(w)+βφ(z) α,β ∈ R w,z ∈FN
where v ∈FN is for each S ⊆ N defined as v(S) = αw(S)+β z(S). The Shapley value is fair in the sense that it
satisfies several axiomatizations (see Winter [2002] for an overview). For instance, Myerson [1980] shows that the
Shapley value is the unique allocation that satisfies the following two axioms:
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(i) Efficiency
The sum of the allocated values adds up to the total worth of the game:
∑
i∈N
φi(v) = v(N)
(ii) Balanced contributions
For any game (N,v) with players i and j (i 6= j), the loss that player i incurs after player j is removed from
the game is equal to the loss that player j incurs after player i is removed from the game:
φi(v)−φi(v|N\ j) = φ j(v)−φ j(v|N\i)
where v|S is the restriction of v to the subsets of S, and φi(v|S) denotes the allocation to player i in the
subgame (S, v|S).
For each player, the number of possible subsets S in (1) equals 2n−1. Thus the computational complexity
increases exponentially in the number of players (see e.g. Faigle and Kern [1992]). Several papers have proposed
approximation techniques where the computational complexity increases only linearly in the number of players
(e.g., Fatima et al [2008] and Castro et al [2009]). Our focus is on an exact determination of the Shapley value for
a specific class of characteristic functions.
Megiddo [1978] shows that the Shapley value is obtained in O(n) computations for games where players are
nodes in a tree. Granot et al [2002] extend this result to heterogeneous preferences of the players. A computational
complexity of O(n2) is found in Deng and Papadimitriou [1994] for a game in which the players are nodes in an
undirected graph. This computational complexity can never be smaller for this class of games since the number of
arcs is O(n2) for a complete graph.
For some classes of characteristic functions, the computational complexity of the Shapley value is polynomial
in the number of players. For example, the Shapley value of a weighted majority game is computed in O(n3)
computations in Algaba et al [2003]. Another example is in Littlechild and Owen [1973], who show that the
computational complexity is O(n) if the worth of a coalition equals the maximal worth of a single coalition player.
We identify in Section 2 another class which has the tractable linear computational complexity. This class con-
sists of characteristic functions where the worth only depends on the number of participating coalition players. In
Section 3 it is shown that the linearity of the Shapley value implies that the computational complexity is unaffected
when we (i) randomize participations, and (ii) randomly draw a characteristic function. Section 4 illustrates the
results by means of an example.
2 Deterministic setting
We start with a deterministic version of our main result that the computational complexity is linear in the number
of players when the characteristic function depends on the number of participating players. Consider a game (N,v)
with n players in N. A bipartition on N indicates which players are participating. For notational convenience, we
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use the participation vector B ∈ [0,1]n to characterize the bipartition:
Bi =
 0 if i is a null player1 if i is a participating player
The total number of participating players in the coalition S is given by κS = ∑i∈S Bi, and we define κ := κN as the
total number of participating players. The following proposition enables us to obtain the Shapley value in O(n)
computations for a special class of characteristic functions.
Proposition 1. Consider the setting described above. If the characteristic function v is of the type
v(S) = κS f (κS) S ∈ 2N
where f : {0,1, . . . ,n}→ R, then the Shapley value of player i equals
φi(v) = Bi f (κ)
This means that the Shapley value of player i equals the fraction Biκ of the worth v(N) of the game.
Proof. We show that the allocation φ(v) satisfies the efficiency axiom as well as the balanced contributions axiom.
It is easy to see that φ(v) satisfies the efficiency axiom because
∑
i∈N
φi(v) = ∑
i∈N
Bi f (κ) = κ f (κ) = v(N)
For any i, j ∈ N (i 6= j), we have φi(v) = Bi f (κ) and φi(v|N\ j) = Bi f (κ−B j), such that the balanced contributions
axiom is necessarily satisfied if
Bi f (κ)−Bi f (κ−B j) = B j f (κ)−B j f (κ−Bi) (2)
Obviously, this equation holds for any of the four possibilities of the pair (Bi,B j). This implies that φ(v) satisfies
the balanced contributions axiom for any game (N,v), as required.
Proposition 1 makes clear that the vector φ(v) is obtained by first computing f (κ) and subsequently Bi f (κ)
for each player i ∈ N. This results in a computational complexity that grows linearly in the number of players in
N.
The class of characteristic functions in Proposition 1 nests the class of voting games where each player has
the same weight. However, it cannot be generalized to weighted Shapley values. For an arbitrary nonzero weight
vector w ∈ Rn (w 6= 0), the balanced contributions axiom changes then into (see Kalai and Samet [1987]):
w j
[
φi(v)−φi(v|N\ j)
]
= wi
[
φ j(v)−φ j(v|N\i)
]
The case wi 6= 0 for exactly one player i is neglected, because the weight vector would become the zero vector
in the game (N\i, v|N\i). We write the allocation in the functional form φi(v|S) = wiγSi Bi f (κS) and show that γSi
depends on the functional form of f . This makes the simple closed form solution in Proposition 1 infeasible. The
efficiency axiom imposes
∑i∈N wiγNi Bi f (κ) = κ f (κ)
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If γNi does not depend on the functional form of f , then we need to have (i) γ
N
i =
1
wi
or (ii) γNi = κ (∑k∈N wkBk)
−1.
By the imposed functional form, the balanced contributions axiom (2) is satisfied for (Bi,B j) = (1,1) when
w jwi
[
γNi f (κ)− γN\ ji f (κ−1)
]
= wiw j
[
γNj f (κ)− γN\ij f (κ−1)
]
The latter equation is only satisfied for any function f if γNi = γ
N
j and γ
N\ j
i = γ
N\i
j . This shows that (i) and (ii) are
both inappropriate, except for the special case w1 = . . .= wn 6= 0 which corresponds with Proposition 1.
3 Stochastic setting
We allow the participation vector B to be a random vector. Besides the fact that the outcome Bi of player i becomes
stochastic, the outcome Bi can be correlated with the outcome B j of another player j. We assume that T different
realizations of the elements in B represent the probability distribution of B.
First, the characteristic function is some given deterministic function. Then, we generalize the setting to a
randomization over a set of characteristic functions.
Deterministic characteristic function The following proposition extends Proposition 1 to stochastic participa-
tion vectors.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the characteristic function v of the game (N,v) is defined as
v(S) = E[κS f (κS)] S ∈ 2N
where f : {0,1, . . . ,n} → R, and the expectation is with respect to the realization of the random vector B. The
Shapley value of player i is then
φi(v) = E[Bi f (κ)]
In words, the Shapley value of player i equals the expectation of the fraction Biκ of the realization of the worth
function κ f (κ).
Proof. Along the lines of the proof of Proposition 1, we show that the allocation of φ(v) satisfies the efficiency
axiom as well as the balanced contributions axiom. It is easy to see that φ(v) satisfies the efficiency axiom because
by the linearity of the expectations operator
∑
i∈N
φi(v) = E
[
∑
i∈N
Bi f (κ)
]
= E[κ f (κ)] = v(N)
For any i, j ∈ N (i 6= j), we have φi(v) = E[Bi f (κ)] and φi(v|N\ j) = E[Bi f (κ−B j)]. Then, the balanced contribu-
tions axiom is necessarily satisfied if for any realization Bˆ of B:
Bˆi f (κˆ)− Bˆi f (κˆ− Bˆ j) = Bˆ j f (κˆ)− Bˆ j f (κˆ− Bˆi)
where κˆ =∑i∈N Bˆi. Obviously, this equation holds for any of the four possible realizations of the pair (Bˆi, Bˆ j), and
so for any realization Bˆ of B. Therefore, this equation is still valid if we take the expectation with respect to B.
This implies that φ(v) satisfies the balanced contributions axiom, as required.
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Since we compute Bi f (κ) for each of the n players and each of the T realizations of B, it is straightforward
that the computational complexity of φ(v) grows linearly in n as well as in T . This result can be generalized to
the setting where the characteristic function v admits v(S) = ∑Tt=1κ
(t)
S f (κ
(t)
S )h(t,B
(t)) for some h : {1, . . . ,T}×
[0,1]n→ R, where B(t) is the t-th realization of B and κ(t) = ∑i∈N B(t)i . The Shapley value of player i is then given
by φi(v) = ∑Tt=1 B
(t)
i f (κ
(t))h(t,B(t)).1 Proposition 2 refers to the special case h≡ 1T . Notice that the characteristic
function and the Shapley value remain deterministic after introducing randomization in B.
Randomization over characteristic functions We extend the stochastic setting to a randomization over a set of
characteristic functions. The set V contains all possible realizations vˆ : 2N → R of the characteristic function v.
The probability measure P is defined on the elements of V . The characteristic function v¯ : 2N→R of the composed
game (N, v¯) is defined as v¯(S) = Ev[v(S)], where Ev denotes the expectation with respect to the realization of v. In
other words, the characteristic function v¯ attaches the weight P(v = vˆ) to the outcome vˆ of v.
The player set N is the same for each vˆ ∈ V . In this way, the dimension of the allocation vector φ(vˆ) that
determines the Shapley value is the same for each vˆ ∈ V . The distribution of B is allowed to depend on vˆ. A
sample of T joint realizations for B and v represent the joint distribution of B and v.
The following proposition extends Proposition 2 to this more general class of games. Additionally, it shows
that a function does not affect the computational complexity if this function does not depend on B, nor on the
coalition S. Again, we obtain the allocation of the Shapley value with a computational complexity that depends
linearly on the number of players as well as the number of observations.
Proposition 3. In the setting described above, let each vˆ ∈ V be separable as
vˆ(S) = EB|vˆ[ fvˆ(BS)]gvˆ
where the expectation is with respect to the realization of B conditional on the event {v= vˆ}, BS is the restriction of
B to the players in S ∈ 2N , fvˆ : [0,1]|S|→ R,2 and gvˆ is a constant or a function that may depend on the realization
vˆ of v, but does not depend on S or the realization of B. The Shapley value of (N, v¯) is then
φ(v¯) = Ev
[
φ(v f )gv
]
where for each vˆ ∈ V
vˆ f (S) = EB|vˆ[ fvˆ(BS)]
Roughly speaking, the Shapley value is simply a weighted average of Shapley values where the weight P(v = vˆ) is
attached to the Shapley value of the game (N, vˆ). The factor gvˆ is only a scaling factor for the Shapley value of
(N, vˆ).
Proof. The characteristic function of the composed game (N, v¯) can be written as
v¯(S) = Ev[v(S)] = Ev
[
v f gv
]
1Here, we do not need to assume that the realizations of B represent its probability distribution.
2This is a slight abuse of notation as the number of arguments of fvˆ depends on the number of players in S. Nevertheless, this should not
introduce any confusion. Otherwise, one could define fvˆ on [0,1]n and impose that fvˆ does not depend on Bi if i /∈ S.
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where vˆ f (S) = EB|vˆ[ fvˆ(BS)]. By the linearity of the Shapley value and the linearity of the expectations operator:
φ(v¯) = φ
(
Ev
[
v f gv
])
= Ev
[
φ(v f )gv
]
This proposition is easily generalized to linear characteristic functions v¯(S) =∑vˆ∈V αvˆvˆ(S). The corresponding
Shapley value equals φ(v¯) = ∑vˆ∈V αvˆφ(vˆ f )gvˆ. Proposition 3 is then the special case αvˆ = P(v = vˆ).
It is known for each of the T realizations of B to which game (N, vˆ) it belongs. Therefore, the computational
complexity of φ(v¯) increases linearly in n, the number of players, and in T , the number of realizations of B.
4 Example
Let the set Nvˆ contain the non-null players in the game (N, vˆ). There are at least 2 players in this set for each vˆ∈ V .
Only a null player does not affect κS = ∑i∈S Bi for any S ∈ 2N . Thus κ := κN = κNvˆ and P(Bi = 0) = 1 if and only
if i /∈Nvˆ. The joint distribution of B and v is known. This means that after selecting a characteristic function vˆ∈ V ,
the probability distribution of B in the game (N, vˆ) is known. Let each vˆ ∈ V admit3
vˆ(S) =
EB|vˆ[κS(κS−1)]
|Nvˆ|−1 (3)
Since v¯(S) = Ev[v(S)], the worth of the game (N, v¯) equals
v¯(N) = Ev,B
[
κ (κ−1)
|Nv|−1
]
.
We define a dependence measure to measure player i’s dependence on other players. This measure is the fraction
of other participating non-null players given that player i is a participating player:4
ξi := Ev,B
[
κ−1
|Nvˆ|−1
∣∣∣∣Bi = 1]
The vector ξ contains this dependence measure for each player i ∈ N. We show that the Shapley value of player i
equals the product of the probability on the event {Bi = 1} and the dependence measure ξi:
φi(v¯) = P(Bi = 1)ξi = Ev,B
[
Bi(κ−1)
|Nv|−1
]
(4)
As a consequence, the dependence measure ξi is related to the Shapley value in such a way that the computational
complexity of both φ(v¯) and ξ is linear in the number of players. We show this result by means of (i) Proposition
2 and 3 as well as (ii) for a specific numerical example.
3Because this vˆ is convex in κS, it follows that the game (N, vˆ) is convex such that the Shapley value is in the core (see Prop. 18.AA.1 in
Mas-Colell et al [1995]). This means that no coalition S ∈ 2N can collectively increase their allocation by playing (S,v).
4This measure is closely related to the systemic importance index in Zhou [2010].
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(i) Notice that vˆ(S) = wvˆ(S)+ zvˆ(S) for the separable functions
wvˆ(S) = EB|vˆ
[
κ2S
]
gvˆ zvˆ(S) =−EB|vˆ[κS]gvˆ
where gvˆ = (|Nvˆ|−1)−1. By Proposition 2, the Shapley value of player i associated with the characteristic
function
w fvˆ (S) = EB|vˆ
[
κ2S
]
is given by:
φi(w fvˆ ) = EB|vˆ[Biκ]
Using w¯(S) = Ev[wv(S)], it follows from Proposition 3 that gvˆ can be interpreted as a scaling factor in
determining the Shapley value of w¯:
φi(w¯) = Ev
[
φi(w fv )gv
]
= Ev,B
[
Biκ
|Nv|−1
]
Similarly, for z:
φi(z¯) =−Ev,B
[
Bi
|Nv|−1
]
The linearity of the Shapley value now gives the desired result (4).
(ii) We confirm the result in (4) for the following numerical example. In the game (N, v¯) with n = 3 players, the
characteristic function is given by (3). The game is over T = 50 equally weighted periods. Player 3 is a null
player during the first 20 periods, which means that the corresponding characteristic function v1 is given by
(3) with Nv1 = {1,2}. In period 21, player 3 enters and remains in the game. The characteristic function v2 is
then given by (3) with Nv2 = {1,2,3}. Table 1 contains the realizations of B and v for this game. Intuitively,
player 3 contributes most to the total value since player 3 participates always simultaneously with another
player. Table 2 provides for each S ∈ 2N the outcomes of the characteristic function v1(S) and v2(S).
Table 1: Realizations for the participation vector B and the characteristic function v. The integer time periods are
ordered by 1≤ t1 < t2 ≤ 20 < t3 < t4 < t5 ≤ 50.
B1 B2 B3 κ v Nv κ−1|Nv|−1
t1 1 1 0 2 v1 {1,2} 1
t2 0 1 0 1 v1 {1,2} 0
other t ∈ {1, . . . ,20} 0 0 0 0 v1 {1,2} –1
t3 1 0 0 1 v2 {1,2,3} 0
t4 1 1 1 3 v2 {1,2,3} 1
t5 1 0 1 2 v2 {1,2,3} 1/2
other t ∈ {21, . . . ,50} 0 0 0 0 v2 {1,2,3} –1/2
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Table 2: Outcomes for vˆ(S) =
EB|vˆ[κS(κS−1)]
|Nvˆ|−1 as in (3)
S v1 v2
/0 0 0
{1} 0 0
{2} 0 0
{3} 0 0
{1,2} 1/10 1/30
{1,3} 0 2/30
{2,3} 0 1/30
{1,2,3} 1/10 4/30
Using (1), the Shapley value distributes v1(N) = 110 and v2(N) =
4
30 as follows among the players:
φ1(v1) =
2 ·0+1 · (1/10−0)+1 · (0−0)+2 · (1/10−0)
6
=
1
20
φ2(v1) =
2 ·0+1 · (1/10−0)+1 · (0−0)+2 · (1/10−0)
6
=
1
20
φ3(v1) =
2 ·0+1 · (0−0)+1 · (0−0)+2 · (1/10− 1/10)
6
= 0
φ1(v2) =
2 ·0+1 · (1/30−0)+1 · (2/30−0)+2 · (4/30− 1/30)
6
=
1
20
φ2(v2) =
2 ·0+1 · (1/30−0)+1 · (1/30−0)+2 · (4/30− 2/30)
6
=
1
30
φ3(v2) =
2 ·0+1 · (1/30−0)+1 · (2/30−0)+2 · (4/30− 1/30)
6
=
1
20
We use that φi(v¯) = Ev[φi(v)] = 2050φi(v1)+
30
50φi(v2) to obtain the second column in Table 3. Hence, the
computations require O(n2nT ) computations. The third and fourth column in Table 3 follow from Table 1,
but require only O(nT ) computations. Indeed, player 3 has the largest dependence measure ξi. It follows
that the second column is equal to the product of the third column and the fourth column, as predicted by
(4). This means that the Shapley value is obtained in O(nT ) computations.
Table 3: Shapley value, participation probabilities, and the dependence measure
Player φi(v¯) P(Bi = 1) ξi
1 1/20 4/50 5/8
2 1/25 3/50 2/3
3 3/100 2/50 3/4
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